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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT W ADKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 19170

VS.

THE DIVISION OF ST ATE LANDS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is

an

action

for

a

declaratory

judgment

that

a

mineral lease

appellant entered into with the Division of State Lands is valid and in full
force and effect,

despite the Division's attempted cancellation of the lease.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After hearing cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that
appellant had not protested the cancellation actions within the time required
by 65-1-9( 2) Utah Code Annotated 1953, and had failed to comply with the
notice, filing of claim, and cost bond provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act (Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Code Annotated 1953).

Respondent's motion

for

was

summary

judgment

was

granted,

and

prejudice

- 1 -

the

action

dismissed

with

48a

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment <>f th<' tn;.il c<>urt and
to the trial court for entry of

a

decL11·;it"rv

JUdgm<°lll

tht

I<>

r~mdnd

df,., t thnt

th"

lease entered into between appellant and the D1v1s10n 0f State Lands is a v;ilid
lease, is in full force and effect despite the attempt of the Division of State
Lands to cancel it,

and that the term of the lease is to be extended for a

period equivalent to that needed to litigate the matter.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 10,
Lands

for

an

oil,

1980,

Robert W.

gas,

and

Adkins applied to the Division of State

hydrocarbon

lease

on

the following described

property in San Juan County:
Lots 3, 4, 5, and 6, the south half of the northwest quarter, and
the south half of Section 2, Township 27 south, Range 20 east, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
The north half of the southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 27
south, Range 21 east, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
The application was granted and under date of March 24,
and the division entered into Lease No. ML37794 (R
On

March 25,

1981,

the

1980, Adkins

5, 18)

Division of State Lands sent Adkins a letter

telling him that the 509. 18 acres in Section 2 had previously been withdrawn
from oil and gas leasing, and therefore that property was being deleted from
the lease,
deleted

and he would receive a refund of $1,020 paid in rentals on the

portion

( R. 18,

22)

On

May 19,

1981,

Adkins

Department of Natural Resources protesting the ;ict10n uf
Lands and requesting a hearing ( R

23)

- 2 -

ih

wrote

to

the

D1,·1010n •lf State

On August 12,

1981,

the Division of State Lands and Forestry sent a

lettPr to Adkins telling him
Please be advised that on August 12, 1981, the Land Board upheld
the partial cancellation of the above-numbered lease with respect to
TL7S, R20E, Section 2:
Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, S~ NW'-.,, S~, thus
reiectmg your formal appeal
Also
notified

on

August 12,

Adkms

that

1981,

the

the Division's Minerals

land

located

in

Section 8,

Resource Specialist
Township 27

south,

Range 21 east, SLM, had also been withdrawn, and that he would recommend
to the Director that the lease be cancelled (R. 70).

On August 17, 1981, the

Dt.rector did cancel the lease, without notifying Adkins of the action (R. 71).
On October 29, 1981, Adkins wrote to the Division, asking whether the lease
had m

fact been cancelled,

hearing ( R
On

and

"pursuant to Section 65-1-9" requested a

25).

February 26,

the Division of State Lands sent the following

1982,

notice to Adkins:
This letter will serve as notice that the Land Board, on
November 10, 1981, considered your appeal of the Director's action
of August 17, 1981, cancelling ML37794 OG&H.
By unanimous vote of the Land Board,
upheld.

the Director's action was

Prior to the cancellation of the lease, the rentals were paid timely, and
subsequent to the cancellation, the rentals were tendered timely by Adkins,
but they were not accepted by the Division of State Lands.
Adkins did not file another "protest" with the Division of State Lands or
with

the

Board

of

State

Lands,

but on February 13,

1982,

notified the

TrP,10ure1· uf the State of Utah that the action of the Board of State Lands
would be

te~ted

lil

the court

Adkins did not file with the Attorney General

- 3 -
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a notice of his claim that the action of the Division of State Lands was invalid
and did not file a claim against the State of litah
an

action

in

the

District

Court

of

Salt

Lake

On ,JunP 8, J'l8'.:, he filed
C<Junty

w1th"ut

f1Jmg

an

undertaking for costs,
On June 14, 1966, the State Land Board had purported to withdraw from
oil and gas leasing the property in Section 2, Township 27 sou th, Range 20
east, covered by the lease with Adkins.

At that time there was no statute

authorizing the State Land Board to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing.
Such authority was given later by Chapter 183, Section 4, Laws of Utah 1967
On June 8, 1967, after authority had been given, the State Land Board
withdrew the 80 acres lying in Section 8 ( R. 38).
When the Adkins lease was entered into, the withdrawals were not shown
on the plat maps maintained by the division (R. 79).

ARGUMENT

PLAINTIFF COMPLIED WITH THE "PROTEST" REQUIREMENTS OF
65-1-9(2) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 PRIOR TO FILING THIS
ACTION
The

letter

from

the

Division

of

State

Lands

dated March 25,

1981,

informed Adkins that the land lying in Section 2 was being deleted from the
lease.

The

letter

from

the

Division

dated

August 12,

1981,

was

a

recommendation to the Director that the lease be cancelled with respect to the
80 acres as well as the "previously deleted portions," and the recommendation
was followed by the Director on August 17, 1981

In both mstances Adkins

protested, and the protests were considered and rejected by the Land Board

- 4 -

But the court ruled that he had not complied with the statute because he had
not protested the Land Board's ruling.
The statute

relied

upon by the Division and by the district court is

65-1-9(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953.
No claimant for lands under control of the board can appeal
for judicial review of a decision of the board involving any sale,
lease, or disposition of state lands, or any action relating thereto,
unless such claimant files a written protest with respect thereto
with the board within 90 days after the final decision of the board
relating to such matter; or, with respect to decisions rendered
prior to the effective date of this act, within 90 days after such
effective date. This provision shall not relate to disputes between
the board and any party as to the ownership or title to any lands.
The above section was enacted in 1963, when all of the functions relative
to state lands were under jurisdiction of the State Land Board.
was

responsible

for

both

policy

and

administration.

Of

performed its functions through subordinates -- its staff.

The Board

necessity,

it

Since it is not

uncommon for administrative staffs to make decisions that are, for all intents
and purposes,

final,

it was

reasonable to provide for submission of such

matters to the Board to make certain that the action was Board action before
permitting resort to the courts.
The
review

section
The

is

not

difference

typical
between

of

statutes

providing

for

administrative

review and final action by a particular

agency is pointed out in 2 Arn. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 542:
An appeal in valves two tribunals, one of which has the power
to decide in the first instance and the other to review on appeal a
decision so made, and, dependent upon the applicable statutes and
the distribution of functions in a particular agency, administrative
review procedures may or may not possess the attributes of appeals
in judicial proceedings.
Even though a statute provides for an
"appeal" it has been held that where the purpose of such appeal is
only to expedite and facilitate the dispatch of business within the
administrative setup and the officer to whom the appeal lies has the
power to decide in the first instance and, on his own motion, to

- 5 -

48a

order a redetermination where no appeal is take>n. the 1rle>a ,,f :i real
appeal is excluded and although in form an appeal is JH'e~'"n kd the
officer exercises original rather than appellatP 1urisclic·t1on
Were the
decisions"

decisions

withm

the

appearance of finality.

to

JelPte

meanmg

Sec·t1nn
of

~

.rnd

fi5-l-9(2l"

t"

CCJnc·d lht· lt·a0<0 "frnal

They

certainly

hacl

the

Had Adkins not acted, he would have had no lease

The fact that the agency action was by letter, rather than formal findings
with an "order" does not prevent the decision from being final.
In Mid-Valley Distilling Corp.

v.

Decarlo, 161 F 2d 485, 488 (3 Cir.

1947), a supervisor under the Federal Alcohol Administration Act had sent a
letter
permits

to

the
had

distilling
resulted

company,
in

the

telling it

automatic

that an

termination

attempted
of

the

transfer of

permits.

The

company sought judicial review, and the supervisor argued that the letter
merely informed the company of the automatic termination and was not an
order.

The Court of Appeals held that if the permits did not automatically

terminate, the letter was an order, and was appealable _
As pointed out in 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 585:
Whether or not a particular administrative determination is an
"order" or is final is determined by the substance of what the
agency has purported to do and has done, and not by the label
placed upon it.
The mere informality of a decision does not
prevent its review if it is otherwise final.
Thus, a letter may
constitute an appealable order or determination. * * *
It is necessary to consider 65-1-9(2) along with 65-1-1 and 65-1-2 1

Those subsequently enacted sections did away with the State Land Board and
distributed its functions to a Division of State Lands and a Board of State
Lands within the Department of Natural Resources
65-1-1.
Board of state lands -- Creation -- Tran'f'"r "f l"_'\\·er2'
and duties~ There is created withu1-tFie depar:tn1..,nt ,-,f n.itUI·ai
resources a board of state lands which, except a, utlwnvise

- 6 -

provided m this act, shall assume all of the policy-making
functions. powers, duties, rights, and responsibilities of the state
land board, together with all functions, powers, duties, rights, and
responsibilities granted to the board of state lands by this act.
The board of state lands shall be the policy-making body of the
d1v1sion of state lands
Except as otherwise provided in this act,
whenever reference is made in title 65, or in any other provision of
law, to the state land board, it shall be construed as referring to
the board of state lands where such reference pertains to
policy-making functions, powers, du ties, rights and responsibilities;
but in all other instances such reference shall be construed as
referring to the division of state lands.
65-1-2. l.
Division of state lands -- Creation -- Power and
authority.
There is created the division of state lands, which
shall be within the department of natural resources under the
administration and general supervision of the executive director of
natural resources and under the policy direction of the board of
state lands.
The division of state lands shall be the state land
authority for the State of Utah, shall assume all of the functions,
powers, duties, rights and responsibilities of the state land board
except those which are delegated to the board of state lands by
this act and is vested with such other functions, powers, duties,
rights and responsibilities as provided in this act and other law.

Within the Department of Natural Resources as reorganized, the Director
of Natural Resources had a right to make final decisions with respect to
matters other than those determining policy for the Division of State Lands.
The actions taken in deleting property from Adkins' leases and in cancelling
the lease were final decisions by the Director (R. 68, 71), the letters written
by

Adkins in response to those decisions were protests, and the Division

treated them as protests.
It is arguable that

the Board of State Lands should not have been

involved at all, because the actions did not involve policy-making, but the
Board of State Lands

purported to act upon them by way of appeal and

hearing. voting unanimously to uphold the actions of the Director.
\J nder

Oi\'1s10n

<)['

the holding of the

district court,

a person involved with the

State Lands would be required to file a protest with the Division,

- 7 -
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obtain a

ruling from

decision.

the

Board of State Lands,

and

protest

the Board's

From a standpoint of administrative procedure or due process this

does not make sense.
highest powers in

Adkins' position

the Department of

calJ,.,<i to Lhe

w~s

~llenllon

of

the

Natu1·al Resources and those powers

determined that the action taken by the director should be upheld

What

possibly could be accomplished by a second appeal to the Board of State
Lands or to the Director of Natural Resources?

II

THE
GOVERNMENT AL
IMMUNITY
ACT
DID
NOT
REQUIRE
PLAINTIFF TO SERVE NOTICE OF HIS CLAIM, TO FILE A CLAIM
AGAINST THE STATE, OR TO POST AN UNDERTAKING FOR
COSTS IN ORDER TO HAVE HIS RIGHTS DETERMINED IN THIS
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION.
The trial court held that Adkins could not maintain the action because he
had not complied with certain provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act,
treating

the

action

as

one

against

the

state.

In

doing

so,

the

court

overlooked the fact that the lawsuit is really aimed at obtaining judicial review
of administrative action.
Declaratory judgment actions have long been recognized as suitable for
that

purpose.

See

22

Am.Jur.2d,

26 C. J. S., Declaratory Judgments,
claim

that

an

administrative

Declaratory

§ 68.

agency

has

Judgments,

Such an action,
acted

jurisdiction, is not an action against the state.

outside

§ 31;

and

premised on the
its

authority

Wisconsin Fertilizer Assoc

or
".:

Karns, 39 Wis. 2d 95, 158 NW2d 294, 297 ( 1968)
Even

if

the

action

is

against

the

state,

the

r·eyuirements

Governmental Immunity Act do not apply, recent decisions of this cour·t

- 8 -

uf

the

having

recognized

governmental

that

the

functions.

In

Governmental
Standiford

Immunity

v.

Salt

Act

Lake

applies

City

only

to

Corporation,

tiOCi P 2d 1230, 1236 (Utah 1980), this court redefined governmental function,

oayrng
We therefore hold that the test for determining governmental
unmunity is whether the activity under consideration is of such a
uni4ue nature that it can only be performed by a governmental
agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity.
Clearly,
this
new standard broadens governmental liability.
However, the position is consistent with the plain legislative intent
in § 65-30-1 ~ ~. , to expand governmental liability.
In Standiford, the court held that operation of a public golf course was
not a governmental function, and the rule announced in Standiford has been
applied consistently since it was handed down in 1980.
Lake

City

Corporation,

629 P. 2d

432

(Utah

1981),

In Johnson v. Salt
the

court

held

that

operation of a sledding course by Salt Lake City was not a governmental
function;

and in Thomas v.

Clearfield City, 642 P. 2d 737 (Utah 1982), the

court held that operation of a sewer system was not a governmental function.
Although the lands involved in this case happen to be state lands, the
sale of land and the leasing of land for oil and gas purposes, or for other
purposes, is not a function that is of such a unique nature that it can only
be performed by a governmental agency, or one that is essential to the core
of governmental activity.
Standiford, Johnson,

Ownership of the land is not the criterion.

In

and Thomas the properties involved were all owned by

the particular municipality.
Even assuming that the leasing of land for oil and gas development is a
guvernmental function for the purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act,
,\dkmo was not required to comply with the notice provision, claim provision,

- 9 -

48a

or cost bond provisions of the act

It is provided m 63-30-5 l't:ih Code

Annotated 1953:
Immunity from suit of
any contractual obligation
rights or obligations shall
sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12,
Notice

of

a

claim

for

aU go\'ernment entit1e:, io ,,,;i1ved do t•,•
and a<'t1un' ,fftomg "ut <Jf c·untr·actu.11
not be subject to the r·eq uiremen ts of
63-30-13 or 63-30-19 of this act

injury

to person or

property is

required by

63-30-11, but that is not what this suit is about, 63-30-12 requires the filing
of a claim within one year after the cause of action arises; 63-30-13 requires
the filing of such a claim with political subdivisions; and 63-30-19 requires
the filing of an undertaking conditioned upon payment by plaintiff of taxable
costs,

None of these provisions governs this case because what plaintiff is

litigating is essentially a contractual obligation,
The cases generally recognize that although in a lease there are some
aspects of conveyance of an estate,
obligations

as

between

the

Medical-Dental

Building

Co.

lessor
of

a lease is also a contract,
and

Los

the

lessee

are

Angeles

v,

Horton

and the

contractuaL
and

See

Converse,

21 CaL 2d 411, 132 P. 2d 457, 462 (1942)
The

New

World

Dictionary

of

the

American Language

(1979)

defines

"lease" as follows:
A contract by which one party (landlord, or lessor) gives to
another (tenant, or lessee) the use and possession of lands,
buildings, property, etc, , for a specified time and for fixed
payments.
See also 9 Words and Phrases (Perm

Ed ) pp, 427-428,

The trial court apparently regarded this proceeding as being governed
by 63-30-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953,

which does not

claim, and bond requirements:

- 10 -

elimmat~

the w•t1c·e

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for
th" recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession
thereof or to quiet title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other
lwn~ thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or secure
an\· aJiudicat10n touching any mortgage or other lien said entity
may have or claun on the property involved.
A state lease is not like the kinds of claims that are described in 63-30-6
which for the most part, are those arising out of rights not dependent upon
state action.

Here we are considering a written agreement, formally executed

by the state, and the right of the state to repudiate the agreement.

III

THE STATE LAND BOARD'S ATTEMPTED WITHDRAWAL FROM OIL
AND GAS LEASING OF LANDS IN SECTION 2 WAS INVALID
BECAUSE IT WAS OUTSIDE THE POWERS OF THE BOARD.
In

1961,

in order to aid the preservation and development of potash

deposits, the Utah State Legislature, by statute, withdrew certain state lands
from oil and gas leasing.
The lands withdrawn included Section 2, Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, and the south
half of the northeast quarter of Township 27 south, Range 20 east, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
Annotated
enactrnen t.

1953

Chapter 155, § 1, Laws of Utah 1961; 65-1-99 Utah Code
In

1963

Chapter 165,

Annotated 1953.

additional lands
§ 1,

Laws

of

were

Utah

withdrawn

1963;

by legislative

65-1-104

Utah

Code

Neither of these statutes withdrew the property in Section 2

that was included in the Adkins lease, but on June 14, 1966, the State Land
Board µurpol'ted to withdraw that property from oil and gas leasing.
minute~

The

uf a meeting of the State Land Board of June 14, 1966, contained the

- 11 -
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The Staff recommended that the balance of Sec 2. l ,ot s 3
:, , b.
SI;; NW\, SI;; [Township 27 south, Range 20 east Salt L:ike [l;i,,,· and
Meridian] be withdrawn from oil and gas leasing L1· the St;it,, Ldnd
Board
·
After discussion and consideration, the B(lclrd und11tm(1u"h p;i2>'.:Jed
the
following
motion
made
by
Mr l!clll'h
st'cunded
hv
Mr Henderson.
I move we concur with the Staff's recommendat10n
As of June 14, 1966,

there was no statutory provis10n authorizing the

state land board to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing
statutes

instructed

the

state

land

board

to

issue

mineral

Instead, the
leases

The

following provisions are pertinent:
65-1-18. The state land board may issue mineral leases for
exploring, developing and producing oil and gas or for prospecting
and mining purposes, upon any portion of the lands or mineral
interests of the state.
65-1-24. The board shall cause all public lands now owned by the
state, or lands to title to which may hereafter be vested in the
state, to be classified and registered and thereafter sold or
leased.

***

It was not until 1967 that the legislature conferred upon the State Land

Board the power to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing
the attempted 1966 withdrawal,

the first

At the time of

paragraph of 65-1-45

Utah Code

Annotated 1953 read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, applications to lease
shall be considered in the order filed. provided, that when
simultaneous applications are filed the land board shall let the land
to the applicant who will pay the highest rental therfor, and
provided further, that applications to lease land already under lease
shall not be received before the date following the exµirat10n of
said lease, and all such applications received on such day shall be
considered simultaneous.
By Chapter 183,

§ 4,

Laws of Utah

65-1-45 was amended to read as follows
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1%7,

thte f,,n·g,,m2,· r;.ir:igrd[•h

Except as otherwise provided herein applications to lease state
lands for mineral purposes shall be considered in the order in
which they are filed
The division of state lands shall have the
;iu!h<onty to withdraw state lands from leasing, but unless state
lands 3re withdrawn and except as otherwise provided herein, the
divis10n shall lease the land to the first qualified applicant who has
filt>d dn appllcat10n in accordance with rules and regulations
promulgated by the board of state lands.
In light of the history of 65-1-45, it is reasonable to assume that prior
to

the amendment in

1967,

the power to withdraw lands from oil and gas

leasing had not been granted to the State Land Board but had been retained
by

the

legislature,

and that the Board's action in attempting to withdraw

certain lands from leasing was invalid.
In

Hirsh

v

Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co. , 51 Utah 558,

172 P.

318

( 1918), at issue was whether notice of filing a remittitur had to be given to

the opposing party.
provide for notice.

Subsequently,

the legislature amended the statute to

In holding that notice had not been required prior to the

amendment, the court said:
As we read the statute, plaintiffs' counsel had a perfect legal
right to have the remittitur go down and to file the same in the
district court just as was done.
Nor is there anything in the
statute which required him to serve notice on appellant or its
counsel that the remittitur had been sent down and filed in the
district court.
That such was the case is, we think, made clear
from the fact that since this motion was determined in the district
court the Legislature has amended section 3351, supra (chapter ll5,
Laws Utah 1917. § 388), by requiring service of notice on the
adverse party in case a remittitur is sent down as was done in this
case, and that the time within which the cost bill must be served
and filed dates from the service of such notice.
If service of
notice had thus been required under the statute as it stood, it
would have been a useless ceremony to have amended it. Clearly
the legislative construction was that the old statute did not require
notice, and therefore they amended it so that service of notice was
required
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See also 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 236
In making material changes in the lang·ucig'° "I .i ~Litutc thP
legislature can neither be assumed tu have rPgar·de(1 such changPs
as without significance, nor to have committed an oversight or to
have acted inadvertently, to the contrary, the general rule is that
a change in phraseology indicates persuasively, and raises a
presumption, that a departure from the old law was intended,
particularly where the wording of the statute is radically
different.

***

IV
INASMUCH AS APPELLANT WAS THE FIRST APPLICANT, THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS WAS OBLIGATED TO ISSUE TO HIM A
LEASE ON THE PROPERTY IN SECTION 2.
The lands in Section 2 had been leased on March 18, 1955, under Oil
and Gas Lease ML6790, MLA5436.
The

minutes

of

the

State

Land

Board of June 14,

1966,

state that

"ML6790 was cancelled on February 14, 1966, for non-payment of rental for
the portion of its term from January 1, 1966, until April 1, 1966."

In light

of the statutory provisions then obtaining, the statement that the lease was
cancelled

is

obviously

incorrect,

and

in

connection with the motions for

summary judgment, Adkins filed an affidavit to the effect that he had not
been able, at the time of the hearing,
circumstances

under

which

the

earlier

to obtain affidavits establishing the
lease

ended.

It

would

appear,

however, that the lease ended by its own tern\s.
At the hearing, it was suggested ( R. 136) that the court might take
The prior lease

notice of the prior lease, and this court may do the same
was

issued

to Walter L.

Morrison

on

March 15,

following provision:
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1955

lt

contained

the

Sect10n 2
TERMS OF LEASE -- This lease, unless terminated
at an earlier date as hereinafter provided, shall be for a primary
term of ten years from and after January 1 next succeeding the
date of issuance hereof and for so long thereafter as oil or gas or
either of them are produced in commercial quantities from the leased
premises
Thus under the terms of the lease, it was to expire on December 31,
1965,

so

April 1,

there
1966 "

was

no "portion of its

term from January 1,

1966,

until

As of January 1, 1966, the term had expired and the lease

therefore was not cancelled by action of the State Land Board.
At the time the earlier lease expired, 65-1-45 Utah Code Annotated 1953
provided·
Except as otherwise provided by law, applications to lease
shall be considered in the order filed; provided, that when
simultaneous applications are filed the land board shall let the land
to the applicant who will pay the highest rental therefor; and
provided further, that applications to lease land already under
lease, shall not be received before the day following the expiration
of said lease, and all such applications received on such day shall
be considered simultaneous.
In all cases where lands become available for leasing by the
state because they are newly acquired or because a previous
mineral lease is cancelled or otherwise terminated by the board,
such land shall be offered for mineral lease by the following
procedure· [Competitive bidding procedures set out.)
As of June 14,

1966, the competitive bidding provisions did not apply

because the land was not newly acquired and was not available for

~easing

because a previous mineral lease had been cancelled or terminated by the
Board.

It

property to

was

then

the first

the obligation of the State Land Board to lease the
qualified applicant,

or to the one offering the best

terms. if the applications were filed simultaneously.
At the tune the lease was entered into with Adkins the land had been
available for

leasing for

some 14 years, and it was not necessary for the
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Division of State Lands to send out notices that the land had become available
for oil and gas leasing.
been

The availability of the land for !P:ising could have

ascertained by any other

parly

as

easily

as

rt

was

ascertained

by

Adkins

v
THE DIVISION OF STATE LANDS IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
THAT LEASE OF THE LANDS TO ADKINS IS INVALID.
When

the

Division

of

State

Lands

announced

to

Adkins

that

the

properties in Section 2 were being deleted from plain tiff's lease, the only
basis assigned therefor was that they had been previously withdrawn.

In

neither case did the Division of State Lands make any suggestion to plaintiff
that the lease was invalid because of the failure of the Board to follow
competitive

bidding (simultaneous offering)

procedures.

The Division was

fully aware of this basis for cancelling the lease (R. 68, 71), but nothing was
said

about

the

procedures

in

the

letters

denying

Adkins'

protests,

and

nothing was said about them in the answer to the complaint in this action
Adkins acted to his detriment, initiating a lawsuit to test the question of
whether the Board had power to withdraw the lands included in his lease
Because of the Board's failure to raise the question of compliance with the
competitive bidding provisions, plaintiff has incurred great expense, including
attorney's fees, and the expenditure of time and effort to litigate the question
of the right of the land board to withdraw the property.
not be heard, at this stage of the proceeding,

The Division should

to state that the lease wao

properly cancelled because of the failure of the Division of State Lands t"
follow prescribed leasing procedures
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This court has recognized that in a proper case the doctrine of estoppel
may be applied against the state.

In Utah State

University~-

Sutro

~Co.,

6.f6 P 2d 71.S, 718-720 (Utah 1982), the court pointed out the necessity of
estoppmg

the

state

in

some

instances

in

order

to

prevent

injustice,

particularly where the activities involved are not authorized by law, but are
not inherently evil.
In

the

present case the Division of State Lands misled Adkins into

believing that certain lands were available for leasing, that he was qualified
to lease them and, finally, that the only basis for challenging the leases was
that they had been withdrawn.

The rights of third persons are not involved,

the state is engaged in business, and critical questions of public policy are
not involved.

The state therefore should be estopped from asserting the

invalidity of the lease and the need to follow simultaneous posting procedures.

CONCLUSION
Adkins did all that could reasonably be expected of him in protesting the
action

taken

by

the

Division

of State Lands.

The action taken by the

Division was final action, and that final action was protested within the time
required by statute.

The protest was duly considered at a hearing before

the Board of State Lands and the action of the Director with upheld.

This

suit was brought to review that action.
The selling and leasing of land is not a type of operation uniquely suited
to

performance

by

a

governmental

agency,

and

is

not

at

the

core of

government activity, and therefore Adkins was not required to comply with
the pnivisions of the Governmental Immunity Act respecting notice of claim,
filing of claim, and filing of an undertaking for costs.
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Moreover, even if the

48a

leasing of lands is a governmental funct10n.

the act10n rnv<dveo a cc•nt r.i<'I

between Adkins and the Division of Stak Lande

.Jfld tht n .. tice.

,·J;nm

an,J

undertaking provisions do not apply
The State Land Board

ill

1966 had no authu1·1tv to wlthdra\\ lands from

leasing for oil and gas, and the implication from the statutes enacted

ill

1961

is that the legislature itself had decided what lands should be withdrawn from
oil and gas leasing and included those lands in statutory provis10ns

It may

be assumed that when the legislature gave to the Division of State Lands the
right to withdraw lands from oil and gas leasing it intended to change the
statute then in effect.
Inasmuch as the lands in Section 2 had been available for leasing for
more than 14 years, it was not necessary for the Division of State Lands to
follow

the competitive bidding procedures presently prescribed by 65-1-45.

and the lease entered into was valid and enforceable
The judgment of the

district court should be reversed and the case

remanded with directions to enter a judgment declaring that the lease between
the Division of State Lands and Robert W. Adkins is valid and in full force
and effect, and that Adkins is entitled to have the term of the lease extended
by the length of time required to establish the validity of the leases, subject
only to his paying the necessary rentals.
Res~~ully submitted.

/j·1,c,,-,~~A_
--- --

B#Ze~--

ROE AND FUWLEH
340 E;1st Fourth s .. uth
Salt Lakt City. l't;ih .~·tl l l
Att<n·nty' fur l'Luntilf-,\1,1wll:rnt
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